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Psychology should be a positive, empiri-
cally informed science of human existence;
that is, a science of human experience of
and acting in the world, in their unity.
Therefore, psychology has to take human
experience seriously. What does it mean
for “psychology of time”?
The term was coined more than a
century ago (Nichols, 1891); but what
“psychology of time” is or should be
has never been defined with full clar-
ity. Its core topic always has been “time
perception”—originating in early psy-
chophysical (Mach, 1865) and physio-
logical (Vierordt, 1868) studies of “time
sense”—with miscellaneous time-related
topics (psychological, developmental, cul-
tural) attached (Fraisse, 1963; Doob, 1971;
Grondin, 2008). Recently, “recognition
of the centrality of psychology of time”
has been advocated (Hancock and Block,
2012), but what is that specific for psy-
chology? Time is a universal concept used
across scientific disciplines, from physics
down to paleontology or archaeology. In
physics, dynamical descriptions of the
phenomena under study are essential, and
thus dimension of time plays a fundamen-
tal rôle; yet there is no special chapter
of physics named “physics of time” that
could claim such a “centrality.” Psychology
studies mental phenomena in their tem-
poral course or relations—e. g., reaction
times, choice times, dynamics of percep-
tion and cognition—but this still does not
constitute a special “psychology of time.”
As social and cultural beings, we act “in”
time and with regard to temporal sched-
ules: wide fields for psychological research,
but why have a particular sub-discipline
for that? Why not leave study of habitual
latecomers to psychology of personality,
and decision times to psychology of con-
sumer behavior?
What makes an essential difference
between events just occurring “in” time—
motions of stars, geyser eruptions, heart
contractions—and human acting “in”
time is that we are aware of time. Or, more
precisely: temporal characters, change,
flux of world-states and bodily states, are
integral part of our experience of the world
and of our-selves in it.
The term “experience of time” is mostly
used synonymously with that of “time per-
ception,” though it may also cover experi-
ence of duration plus awareness of other,
qualitative temporal characters (sensible
present, past–future, etc.). I will use it
in the more restrictive sense. Of course,
“time perception” is a misnomer; “time is
not an apple” (Woodrow, 1951). We do
not perceive time; what we do perceive
are events, occurring “out there” in the
world, their temporal qualities and rela-
tions. Here we are interested not so much
in performance of human subjects in “time
perception” tasks but rather in the subjec-
tive experience as the primary basis upon
which the notion and knowledge of time
are constituted.
Consider a simple psychophysical
experiment: a luminous stimulus of
duration varied across several orders of
magnitude (o. o.m.) is presented to the
observer. For very short durations, from
1/1000 s up to about 1/100 s, only a flash
of light of indefinitely short duration is
seen. Variations of physical duration do
not translate directly into experienced
duration; it is rather the integral mag-
nitude of the luminous sensation—its
“volume,” so to speak—that changes.
Conversely, changes in the exposure time
can be counter-balanced by changing the
luminous flux to obtain the same sen-
sation magnitude (Talbot’s law). From
some critical duration on (∼1/30 s), the
percept gains an elementary temporal
quality, so that the observer is able to
distinguish between shorter and longer
exposures, but its singular “flash-like”
character is preserved. Finally, at exposure
times of about 1/2 to 1 s, the onset and
outset of the luminous appearance can
be differentiated as two distinct events.
From here on, the temporal extension
of the stimulus is really perceived as
duration.
The experiment illustrates existence of
regions on the physical continuum of
the control parameter (duration) delim-
ited by more-or-less well defined bound-
aries (Wackermann, 2007). Stimuli from
within the same region elicit percepts of
the same quality; transgressing a bound-
ary causes a transition to a different kind of
experience. Descriptions applicable within
one region cannot be transfered naïvely
to another region, as exemplified by the
brightness–duration interaction. This says
that subjective experience is not delib-
erately “scalable” or decomposable into
smaller elements. In our experiment, an
extremely fast flash of light—say, a xenon-
tube electric discharge in the o. o.m.
of microseconds—will result in an irre-
ducible sensory datum where the notions
of “shorter” or “longer” cannot be applied
meaningfully. It is not just “shorter” than
in the o. o.m. of milliseconds; it is qualita-
tively different and thus incommensurable.
In physics, 1ms = 1000 × 1µs; but one
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perceived “milliflash” does not consist of a
thousand “microflashes.”
Perception of duration does not hold
for deliberately long times, either. For
example, in duration reproduction exper-
iments with stimuli prolonged up to a
few tens of seconds, the response curve—
i. e., reproduced duration expressed as
a function of the presented duration—
progressively flattens, discrimination acu-
ity decreases, and the observers become
uncertain or unable of beholding the dura-
tion as a singular, indivisible experiential
datum. This phenomenon finds a natural
interpretation within the framework of the
“lossy integration” model of neural repre-
sentation of time (Wackermann and Ehm,
2006; Sysoeva et al., 2011): as the durations
become comparable with the relaxation
times of the lossy integrators, duration dis-
crimination necessarily deteriorates. This
is why we call this upper bound of “live”
time experience the “horizon of repro-
ducibility” (Wackermann, 2007). There
is no sharp boundary, 1 but the ability
of duration representation as a unitary
experiential datum definitely ceases some-
where in the o. o.m. of a few minutes.
Alternative mechanisms may be involved
and additional temporal cues invoked
for a cognitive re-construction of longer
durations.
This is a fortiori true for still longer
times of hours, days, years. The multi-
tude of conventional units alone indicates
how time becomes fractioned and struc-
tured in a system of parallel overlapping
time-scales, maintained by clocks and cal-
endars. Clearly, it is the inability of human
mind to keep a “measure of time” across
longer intervals that enforced the inven-
tion of external time-keeping, chronome-
try, time reckoning (Whitrow, 1988; Birth,
2012). On these time-scales there is no
“time experience”; these times are not
“perceived,” only known. Also, external
time-keeping allows us to refer even to
events beyond the biological limits of our
lives, and creates a kind of impersonal
objectivity we associate with the order of
world-time.
1If our interpretation in terms of “lossy integration”
is correct, the fuzziness of the upper boundary may
be explained by inter-individual differences (Sysoeva
et al., 2010) and intra-individual state-dependence
(Späti, 2005; Wackermann et al., 2008) of the relax-
ation times of the integrators.
Touching the problem of human
life-time: we should distinguish between
biological time, seen from outside,
and biographic time, seen from inside.
Humans not only live but “conduct” their
lives (Plessner, 1975), and are aware of
times of their lives. This existential fact
finds its psychological counter-part in the
concept of “mental time travel,” that is, the
ability “to mentally project themselves
backwards in time to re-live, or for-
wards to pre-live, events” (Suddendorf and
Corballis, 2007). It is a highly problematic
metaphor, as the notion of “time travel”
itself. Nonetheless, the catchy metaphor
has made a career in the literature, and
motivated research in comparative psy-
chology, personality psychology, cognitive
neuroscience, etc. (Suddendorf et al., 2009;
Nyberg et al., 2010).
Now, representation of past events, or
anticipation of future events refers explic-
itly to biographic time, consisting of (only
partially ordered) biographic moments,
episodes of personal relevance and existen-
tial importance, separated by indetermi-
nate “time-spaces.” Some of past moments
may be identified in terms of calendar
time, but their “time indices” are more
often given by a network of logical and
material causalities, social circumstances,
etc. The content of those episodes may
be “experienced” (memory recall, antici-
pating imagination), but not their times;
these are accessible only by cognitive
(re)construction.
By contrast, experience of temporal
characters of perceivable events (for short:
“time perception”) happens on a “local
timescale”: in the range (approximately)
from 100 s to 102 s (Wackermann, 2007),
i. e., of about two decadic o. o.m. A unique
temporal quality specific for this domain
is duration, as a measure of “tempo-
ral distance” between distinct events and
sub-events. Only in this relatively narrow
domain we can speak properly of “experi-
ence of time,” or “time experienced.”
These are two different orders of dif-
ferent kinds of events, or plainly: two
different times. Biographic time is not a
sum of chunks of experiential time; and
conversely, experienced durations are not
measures of fragments of biographic time.
It is not only a matter of different time-
scales: the long does not result from sum-
mation or multiplication of the short.
The two orders of times are mutually
irreducible and thus incommensurable. Of
course, we can map both orders of time,
those “perceived” and those “known,”
onto the continuum of physical world-
time. The difference of time scales does
not play any rôle, since physical time is
arbitrarily scalable. In physics, we can
measure times of planetary motions by
times of light-wave oscillations, or vice
versa—not so in the realm of human expe-
rience2. The mapping onto a common
background of world-time obscures or
eliminates experiential content of the orig-
inals and the essential difference between
them. Projections of two things onto a
photographic plate give one fused image,
but this does not make the two originals to
be one thing!
Psychologists aiming at a unified “psy-
chology of time” may be mislead by
the concept of universal time of physics,
applicable across all time-scales, and
search for its analogy in the mental
domain. Although they recognize differ-
ences between time of subjective expe-
rience and the objective clock-time—
evergreen of popular “psychologies of
time” since ever—they adhere to the idea
of a unitary (though not inter-individually
identical) order of mental or biographic
events, arranged along a continuum of
subjective time indices: “psychological
time.” I will not reiterate my earlier cri-
tique of this concept (Wackermann, 2008);
may it suffice to say that there is no neces-
sity for the construct of “psychological
time” and no compelling evidence for it.
In fact, phenomenology of our experience
of time speaks rather against it.
Once again: experience matters. We
should observe the very structure and tex-
ture of experience precisely and adjust our
conceptual schemes and theories to what
is observed—not the other way round.
Findings from experimental or clinical
neuroscience may provide novel insights
(Fingelkurts et al., 2010; Nyberg et al.,
2010; Østby et al., 2012) but we should
be aware that these are only supplementary
2 In the model of time as arithmetic continuum, time
indices of instants and time intervals between instants
are naturally connected by arithmetic operations, and
so we easily forget the generic difference between
the indices (“when-times”) and durations (“between-
times”). In subjective experience, however, these are
two different things!
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FIGURE 1 | Two dimensions of time. Upper part: biographic time
consists of passed (Eni ) or anticipated (F
n
i ) episodes, connected by logical
or material dependencies (dotted lines) and thus partially ordered. Lower
part: the actually present episode, E0, comprising subsequent events
P1, P2, . . . that are co-present (P ′1, P
′
2, . . .) to the observer’s
consciousness at O and ordered along the dimension of experienced
time (vertical arrow). The two systems of events, inter-episodic
(biographic) as well as intra-episodic (actual experience), are cognitively
projected (gray arrows) onto the dimension of physical world time
(horizontal arrow) which serves as a common reference for all
time-orders and time-scales. Note: The two-dimensional map Pn → P ′n is
essentially Husserl’s (1928) “diagram of time,” modified in order to
illustrate the non-linear metric of subjective duration and the finite
horizon of time experience (cf. Wackermann, 2005, p. 201).
data, informing but not determining our
concepts. Regarding arguments from neu-
ral correlates and, particularly, conceptual
unifications based on “shared networks”:
there is only one brain for all kinds of
mental functioning; resources are limited,
so functional re-use is likely and proba-
bly necessary. The same applies, mutatis
mutandis, to studies with neurological
patients (El Haj et al., 2013).
The qualitative difference between
“time experienced” and “time known” is
evident and, in my view, unsurmountable.
Instead of a forceful unification, a theory
adequate to the structure of human expe-
rience should acknowledge and further
elaborate this duality of times. How this
can be done—this would be a subject for
another essay. Here a few scarce remarks
must suffice:
One-dimensional time is not an
untouchable dogma; it is only a spe-
cial feature of the arithmetic model of
time employed in physics and public
chronometry. We may think of the two
times, biographic time and experienced
time, not as two scales imposed on the
same dimension but as two orthogonal
dimensions (Figure 1). The co-presence of
events within the horizon of actual pres-
ence is represented by the vertical, “depth”
dimension, while the order of successive
but essentially discontinuous episodes
is represented by the horizontal dimen-
sion. It is only post hoc, in chronometric
reconstructions, that both dimensions are
collapsed and aligned with the continuum
of the physical world time. Unlike popu-
lar metaphors of “passage of time,” “time
flow” or point-like “now” sliding along
the time axis, our picture suggests a differ-
ent kinetic metaphor: a transversal wave
in a stationary medium, where the “local
motions” of the medium are not identi-
cal with the “global motion” (i. e., wave
propagation) but orthogonal to it.
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